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1.        Introduction 
The Great War of 1914-18 constituted a major rupture for the 
economies of Europe in several respects. It marked the end of almost a 
century of uninterrupted economic growth. It ended a long period of near-
universal currency stability, and set in motion a painful process of de-
globalisation. It brought about an age of highly politicised labour relations. 
And it ushered in an era in which sharp fluctuations of economic activity 
and persistent mass unemployment became the dominant experience of 
everyday life.  
While the beginning of this dramatic period can clearly be identified 
with World War I, its effects lasted beyond the end of World War II. 
Throughout the interwar period, the economies of Europe remained far 
below their historical growth paths. Full recovery from this long-lasting 
depression occurred only during the Golden Age of the 1960s. But not all 
of the displacement from historical trends that took place after World War 
I was ultimately corrected, and some of the changes became permanent. 
In the more developed economies of Europe, a marked upward shift in 
labour’s income shares occurred after 1918. To this added compression 
of wages and of the personal income distribution in general. Both 
favoured low incomes and reduced the shares taken by top earners. Most 
of these distributional shocks of the early interwar period have been 
permanent and are still visible in the economies of Europe today. 
Monetary conditions were also fundamentally altered after World War I. 
Some of the changes were temporary in nature. Most prominent among 
these were the dramatic hyperinflations hitting the former Central Powers 
and their successor states in the early 1920s. Equally temporary were the 
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deflationary waves elsewhere in Europe in the early 1920s, and more 
universally in the early 1930s. Other regime changes in monetary 
conditions were more permanent, most importantly the aborted attempt to 
reconstruct the Gold Standard in the 1920s. The traumatic consequences 
of this experience had far-reaching consequences for the reconstruction 
of the monetary system after World War II. More persistent in nature was 
also the notable reduction in the freedom of international capital flows, 
and later of foreign trade as such.  
The period between the World Wars also marked a sea change in 
macroeconomic policy. In contrast to the 19th century, where modest 
policy intervention had been the accepted norm, activism in economic 
policy now became the order of the day. State intervention in the markets 
for goods, factors of production, and money quickly became widespread. 
In this context, institutions were created that often acquired constitutional 
status, in some cases with effects lasting to today. Not all of the policy 
experiments after World War I were equally long-lived, though. Attempts 
to achieve monetary stabilisation with paper currencies were quickly 
abandoned, and an – albeit half-hearted – return to gold took place in the 
mid-1920s. A second transition to paper currencies in the early 1930s 
was only marginally more successful, this time not because of inflation 
but rather because of increasingly tight capital controls and import quotas 
which in most parts of Europe suffocated international trade and capital 
movements. While these trade restrictions were dismantled with relative 
ease after World War II, only in the 1970s was a solution found that 
combined regional fixed exchange rate blocs with liberalised capital 
movements. But still, even today no system is in place that would render 
the services of the Classical Gold Standard that prevailed before 1914. 
Economic planning began as an improvised response to shortages 
during World War I, but soon acquired systemic character in a number of 
European countries. Industries were nationalised or supervising state 
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agencies created, attempting to exert political control both at the macro 
and micro levels, and to reduce the exposure of the national economy to 
business fluctuations. Again, the effects of these changes were long-
lived, with lasting macroeconomic effects. Deregulation of state-controlled 
sectors, as well as divestment from state-owned industries, lasted almost 
to the end of the 20th century. The end of the Soviet system in Eastern 
Europe, where economic planning and the abolition of private property 
rights had been driven to the extreme, is but the most evident case in 
point. 
Economic policy was itself a dimension of international conflict 
during the period of 1914 to 1945.  Economic warfare was never quite off 
the agenda of national policy makers during the interwar years. Conflicts 
over German reparations seriously affected monetary policy and trade 
relations, as well as international capital flows during the 1920s (Temin, 
1989). To an even stronger degree, the economies of Europe were 
overshadowed by Germany’s aggressive stance and war preparation in 
the 1930s.  
With political intervention came the attempt to deepen the 
theoretical understanding of its effects. The interwar period saw the 
invention of macroeconomics as a separate subfield of economics. It 
soon extended from the new Keynesian theory of unemployment to public 
sector economics, balance of payment theory, and monetary economics.  
At the same time, rapid progress was made in welfare economics. 
Shaped by the traumatic experience of the interwar years, the economics 
generated in this period were sceptical about market forces, dismissive of 
the power of monetary and exchange rate policy, and highly optimistic 
about the power of the state to intervene in economic activity, be it 
through fiscal policy, financial repression, or a combination of the two. 
Again, the consequences were far-reaching, as this mindset shaped an 
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interventionist approach to macroeconomic policy that prevailed far into 
the 1970s. 
Given the highly pathological nature of our period of interest, there 
has never been a shortage of attempted economic interpretations. 
Explaining the Great Depression after 1929 has even come to be 
regarded as the “holy grail” of macroeconomic theory (Bernanke (2000). 
Given the complexity of the phenomenon and the multiplicity of rivalling 
explanations, any attempt at describing the business cycle of the period 
from 1914 to 1945 will necessarily have to be eclectic, walking a fine line 
between the single-mindedness needed to achieve analytical depth and 
the imprecision required for providing a tour d’horizon. 
This chapter sets out to review Europe’s macroeconomic 
performance between 1914 and 1945. It highlights key stylised facts and 
surveys some of the most prominent attempted explanations. Section 2 
looks at a salient feature of this period, the highly persistent deviation of 
aggregate output per capita from its long term growth path after 1914. 
Inspection of these data suggests a business cycle chronology that holds 
for most of the countries for which we have data. Section 3 reviews 
monetary factors and highlights the instability of the nominal side of the 
economy in this period. Section 4 turns to social conflict as one driving 
force of the interwar business cycle, and looks at its consequences. 
These include the displacement of factor shares after World War I in key 
European countries, the shortening of the industrial workweek, as well as 
concomitant declines in income inequality. Section 5 documents the 
interplay between macroeconomic fluctuations and international trade and 
capital flows. Section 6 turns to foreign policy and international conflict as 
a possible driving force behind much of the interwar business cycle, and 
argues that its influence was pervasive. Section 7 concludes with remarks 
on the two dimensions of conflict that shaped the macroeconomic 
performance of the interwar period. Far from being a normal business 
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cycle, economic fluctuations during the period between 1914 and 1945 
were primarily driven by two forces that shaped events and profoundly 
altered the economic constitution of the European polity. One was social 
conflict and the institutions and labour market responses it created. The 
other was international conflict and the de-globalisation of the European 
economy it caused. Influenced by these two forces, the interwar period 
exhibited highly pathological macroeconomic performance, but was 
formative for the European economy during the second half of the 20th 
century. 
 
 
2.        Identifying the European business cycle 
The interwar period saw a succession of short-term business 
cycles, and at the same time was a long-term recession from historical 
productivity trends. This downward deviation began during the First World 
War and continued until the end of the Second World War. In the three 
decades after 1914, Europe’s economy was in recession relative to trend 
during 14 years, and cumulatively lost thirty percent of its potential output 
(see Figure 1) 1.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Mirroring this development, the recovery from this depression, 
commonly referred to as the post-war Golden Age, lasted to the 1970s. 
Why Europe’s economic reconstruction from World War I remained 
                                         
1  Figure 1 is drawn under the assumption of 1.96% annual trend growth in GDP per 
capita, close to the 2% that are commonly regarded as trend growth in neoclassical 
growth theory. The slight downward deviation from the accepted stylized facts is 
caused by slightly lower trend growth in Britain. See on this Crafts and Mills (1996) and 
Crafts and Toniolo (1996), who argue for a break in British growth in the interwar 
period.  Data in Figure 1. are calculated for the 14 European for which annual data are 
provided in Maddison (2003).  
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incomplete, precipitating a Great Depression of thirty years, is one set of 
issues to be addressed in this chapter.  
Embedded in Europe’s long term depression were three short term 
recessions. The first lasted on average from 1914 to 1921, the second 
from 1929 to 1932, and the third from 1940 to 19462. With two of these 
recessions linked to the World Wars themselves, this would leave one 
true interwar recession. 
Yet the aggregate European picture conceals major regional 
differences. Germany and most countries in Continental Europe were 
seriously affected by the WW1 recession, suffering output declines of up 
to 25% relative to pre-war levels. In contrast, Britain and Italy experienced 
a wartime boom. A major international recession in 1920/21 decreased 
national output in these two countries quite severely (by 20 and 25 %, 
respectively) but was hardly noticeable in most of Europe. During the rest 
of the 1920s, the economies of continental Europe recovered well, 
coming close to or even superseding the historical productivity trend 
(Figure 2). The two big exceptions to the rule are Germany and Britain, 
where recovery remained grossly incomplete: relative to a 2% productivity 
trend, neither country had recovered to much more than 80% of its 
potential by 1929.  
 
(Figure 2 about here)  
 
The international recession of 1929 affected the whole of Europe, 
albeit in rather unequal measure. By the mid-1930s, the depression had 
reduced much of Europe to the low utilisation of their potential that had 
characterised Germany and Britain already in the 1920s. For most of 
                                         
2  The evidence in Figure 1 seems robust to alternative assumptions about trends. 
Using e.g. a HP filter with the parameters suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) leads to 
broadly the same chronology. 
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these economies, the late 1930s were a time of relative stagnation or 
further deterioration, which accelerated in Southwest Europe with the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-39) and elsewhere with World War II (1939-45). 
Three major exceptions to this regularity stand out: Germany, Britain, and 
Scandinavia. In all three cases, recovery back towards the trend began in 
19333. This recovery was most complete in Scandinavia, which almost 
fully grew back to trend by 1939. Germany experienced vigorous recovery 
to 1939 but was unable to continue on this path during World War II. 
Britain was hit less hard than Germany by the recession of 1929-32 and 
accordingly had a more muted recovery. During World War II, however, 
Britain’s position relative to trend improved and quickly reached parity 
with Germany.  
With a view to these distinct regional patterns, four groups of 
analytical issues suggest themselves. First, there is the question of what 
drove the recession of World War I, and why its regional effects on the 
economies of Europe differed so widely. A second set of questions 
relates to the speed and degree of economic recovery from World War I. 
A third group relates to the depression of the early 1930s, and to the 
question of why recovery remained isolated to a few places, while the rest 
of Europe experienced continued in depression through the 1930s. The 
fourth set of questions relates to the deepening recession during World 
War II. For all of these phenomena, a variety of explanations have been 
offered in the respective national and comparative literatures. While it is 
not possible here to review the many national cases in detail, certain 
common patterns do emerge. The following sections will consider the 
most prominent of them in turn. 
 
                                         
3  In the undetrended series, Britain’s recovery begins already a year earlier. Relative to 
trend, however, this year was still one of recession. 
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3.        Monetary factors in the interwar European business cycle 
While monetary calm reigned in most of Europe during the 
Classical Gold Standard of the late 19th century, Europe’s monetary and 
financial systems emerged battered from World War I. All countries had 
suspended gold convertibility in 1914, and wartime inflation had pushed 
price levels up by 50 percent or more. After the war ended, inflation was 
still rampant in the weak democracies that had newly been established in 
Central Europe. In other countries where the political environment was 
more favourable, post-war monetary stabilisation met with the new 
phenomenon of downward rigid wages, itself partly a consequence of the 
newly introduced collective wage bargaining schemes. Deflation in these 
countries combined with rising unemployment and low rates of output 
growth or even outright recession, as in Italy or Britain. Monetary 
stabilisation in Europe took almost a full decade after the war, and was 
just completed when the recession of 1929 struck.  
Hyperinflation was rife in Germany as well in Austria, Hungary, and 
Poland. The first two were the former Central Powers, while the latter two 
had regained their independence after the dissolution of the Habsburg 
monarchy and the reversal of the 18th century partition of Poland between 
Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburgs. Inflationary war finance, deficient tax 
systems, new customs borders and the concomitant decline of trade, as 
well as political turmoil towards the end of World War I all contributed to 
monetary instability in these countries. By 1919 or 1920, price levels had 
already increased tenfold or more compared to 1914 (Figure 3a). As a 
consequence, the middle classes’ savings in nominal assets had 
essentially lost their value, and the most of war debt had been 
annihilated. Yet in all of these countries, the transition to hyperinflation 
only came after inflation had performed its fundamental economic 
function of wiping out the war debt. One major factor contributing to this 
delayed outburst of post-war hyperinflation was the inability of the newly 
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formed states to enforce effective taxation. Political and fiscal stabilisation 
in the hyperinflation countries of the 1920s indeed went hand in hand, 
and monetary stabilisation followed once order had been restored to 
public finances (see Sargent (1982) and Dornbusch (1987)). Austria and 
Hungary were the two economies that had been particularly hard hit by 
the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. With international help and 
rigorous public spending cuts, they stabilised in 1922 and 1924, 
respectively. Germany stabilised in late 1923, after internal revolts had 
been crushed, an understanding with France on accepting mediation in 
the conflict over reparations had been reached, and after emergency 
legislation had been passed to restore order to the government budget. 
Poland’s stabilisation was delayed by war with Russia, and later by trade 
conflict with Germany. Poland’s first, abortive attempt to join the gold 
standard in 1924 was followed by successful stabilisation in 1926. In all 
cases, currency stabilisation proved successful, as Figure 3a bears out: 
price levels did not spiral out of control again until World War II or after4.  
Britain as well as most of the neutral countries of World War I 
returned to gold at the pre-war parity, reversing wartime inflation. Like in 
the U.S., deflation from wartime price levels was substantial but failed to 
restore pre-war price levels. By the end of the 1920s, consumer prices in 
these countries were on the average still 50 percent higher than in 1914, 
well in line with the U.S. Again, stabilisation was successful, as in most of 
these countries, the price levels of 1925 were not surpassed again before 
World War II (see Figure 3b). Wartime inflation after 1940 broadly 
repeated the pattern of moderate inflation from World War I, with the 
important exception that no post-war deflation occurred in these countries 
after 1945. 
                                         
4  In the German case, the inflationary trauma was a major factor in avoiding currency 
devaluation in the 1930s, motivating policy makers to impose capital controls instead, 
see Borchardt (1984). 
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A number of countries led by France went the middle way and 
allowed prices to increase seven- to tenfold during World War I, without 
experiencing post-war hyperinflation, and also without attempting to 
return to pre-war gold parities. During the interwar period, price levels in 
these countries fluctuated around the levels attained in the early 1920s. 
As a consequence, war-related debts issued in domestic currency as well 
as nominal savings lost substantial parts of their value. This group of 
economies proved markedly less resistant than the others to the 
recurrence of wartime inflation in World War II, as Figure 3c shows.  
 
(Figure 3 about here)  
 
The monetary policy choices of the various European countries 
after World War I have attracted much scholarly attention. Britain’s 
decision to accept post-war deflation to prepare for the return (ultimately 
in 1925) to the pre-war parity has been criticised ever since Keynes 
warned against the consequences of deflating. Downward wage rigidities, 
he argued, would increase real wages and thus translate deflation into 
depression.5 This link between the recession of 1920/1 and deflation after 
World War I is nowadays widely accepted6. Indeed, countries that 
experienced inflation at the time were spared from this recession.7 On the 
other hand, the same countries had seen the trough of their respective 
deep recessions around 1918/19 (see Figure 2 above). In addition, post-
war deflation gained momentum in Britain only after the depression had 
set in8, just as post-war inflation in continental Europe picked up speed 
                                         
5  On the discussions among experts before Britain’s return to gold, still see Moggridge 
(1969). 
6  See, prominently, Eichengreen (1992b) and Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo (1997).  
7  For Germany, this point has been made by Webb (1989) and Holtfrerich (1986). 
8  This point has been made by Cole and Ohanian (2002) and earlier by Broadberry 
(1986). 
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only after the recovery had begun. Whether post-war deflation was 
indeed the cause for recession thus continues to be an open issue. 
At the same time, Keynes’ argument went, a British return to gold 
parity after an insufficient degree of price deflation would increase the real 
exchange rate relative to those countries that did not deflate, or that 
stabilised after going through hyperinflations. Relative price levels in 
Europe did vary considerably after the return to gold in the late 1920s, 
and the evidence does indeed bear out some of this claim. Converting the 
price level data in Figure 3 above into real exchange rates suggests 
strong currency undervaluation relative to the pound for the hyperinflation 
countries (albeit far less so for Germany), see Figure 4a. Currencies that 
stabilised at the pre-war parity were on the whole quite close to 
purchasing power parity with the pound, with the Netherlands as the only 
exception of some importance, see Figure 4b. Currency stabilisation at 
less than the pre-war parity par did coincide with substantial 
undervaluation, as evidenced in Figure 4c.  
 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 
The undervaluation of the French Franc has attracted much 
scholarly attention, not the least because of the implicit accusation that 
France manipulated the Gold Standard for its own political ends. More 
recent scholarship has pointed to French domestic instability and inflation 
as a source of currency instability in the 1920s, see Prati (1991), Mouré 
(1991), and Sicsic (1993). Whatever the political motives, it is apparent 
that France was not an isolated phenomenon. In the Gold Standard of the 
late 1920s, violations of purchasing power parity were prevalent in 
countries that had stabilised at lower parities, and were not quickly 
corrected by market forces.  
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On the whole, it appears that those countries that stabilised at new 
parities fared substantially better in terms of unemployment in the 1920s 
than the others. Figure 5 shows indices of unemployment (1932=100) for 
the same country groups as before. The unemployment experience of the 
countries stabilising after hyperinflations was mixed, see Figure 5a. 
Countries that had gone through deflations to stabilise at pre-war parities 
often suffered protracted unemployment already in the 1920s (Figure 5b). 
In contrast, those stabilising at lower rates enjoyed near-full employment 
in the 1920s (Figure 5c).  
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 
All countries of Europe were badly affected by the adverse shock 
than came with the international depression after 1929. However, the 
crisis affected the countries of Europe in unequal measure and at 
different times. As Figures 3 and 4 bear out, the crisis was not primarily a 
deflationary or real exchange rate shock: deflationary tendencies in the 
gold parity countries were well under way in the 1920s already and just 
accelerated again after 1929, while real exchange rate movements did 
not really matter until 1931/32. Figures 1 and 2 bear out a strong output 
shock after 1929, although the timing of this shock seems far from 
uniform. The unemployment data in Figure 5c broadly confirm this: on the 
whole, the countries that stabilised below par in the 1920s were 
latecomers to the depression of the 1930s. Compared to their good 
performance in the 1920s, they were also harder hit by the depression, 
and for the most part took longer to recover in the 1930s. 
To what extent the economic collapse after 1929 was driven by 
monetary policy is still debated. Monetarist orthodoxy has blamed the 
decline, as well as most of the depression as such, on contractionary 
monetary policy in the U.S. in the late 1920s, see Friedman and Schwartz 
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(1963). Critics have pointed out that Europe, notably Germany, created its 
very own deflationary pressures (Temin, 1989). The credit-oriented view 
that prevails in most of the discussion today sees reduced U.S. capital 
exports as the proximate cause of monetary contraction in Europe, see 
Kindleberger (1973), Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo (1997). Clearly, fixed 
exchange rates and generally high capital mobility under the restored 
Gold Standard of the 1920s acted as a mechanism that quickly 
transmitted the shock through Europe, see Choudri and Kochin (1980) 
and Bernanke (1995). Central banks across Europe reacted to reserve 
losses by tightening monetary policy according to the rules of the game of 
the Gold Standard. Fiscal policy played its part by tightening public 
budgets and compensating for lost tax revenue with spending cuts. In a 
matter of two or three years, price levels across Europe decreased by up 
to a quarter.  
Yet the seemingly obvious connection between deflation and 
unemployment is less than easy to find in the data. Research on the 
dynamic Phillips curve would suggest short-term trade-offs between 
inflation and unemployment that allow monetary policy to have effects 
until the natural rate of unemployment is restored, see Clarida, Gertler 
and Gali (1999). Yet while there was ample variation in both 
unemployment and inflation during the interwar period, no systematic 
pattern seems to emerge in the data, even if the 1920s and the 1930s are 
looked at separately. The picture emerging from Figure 6 is rather that the 
natural rate of unemployment moved quite independently of inflation, 
irrespectively of whether or not a country was on gold.9  
 
(Figure 6 about here) 
                                         
9   Much more rigorous analysis would be needed to substantiate this point further. 
However, standard econometric procedures confirm this conclusion. This is left as an 
exercise to the reader. 
 13
Downward spiralling prices increased the pressure on the banking 
system, as well as on central banks’ currency reserves, which became 
politically unbearable in 1931. In May of 1931, Austria faced a banking 
crisis, and a run on the central bank was only narrowly averted.10 In July, 
Germany partly suspended convertibility after a bank run, forcing her 
international short term creditors to roll over existing loans.11 Partly as a 
consequence of seeing her loans to Europe frozen, Britain was forced to 
abandon gold in September. This truly revolutionary step – Britain had 
always been on gold in peacetime since the 1720s – marked the effective 
end of the gold standard.12 Governments all across Europe soon 
scrambled to either let their currencies float or protect them behind a 
firewall of capital controls, often doing both and embarking on a run to 
competitive devaluation. The countries of Scandinavia had pegged their 
currencies to the Sterling. Many countries in continental Europe followed 
Germany in abandoning convertibility so that whatever parity they 
adhered to became a mere numéraire without much economic meaning. 
Only a small group of countries held out in a French-dominated Gold bloc, 
which collapsed in 1936.  
There is general agreement that, just as the gold standard 
transmitted the recessionary impulses internationally, breaking the 
“Golden Fetters” (Eichengreen, 1992) contributed to recovery. 
Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) as well as Bernanke and James (1991) 
argued for a connection between the speed of recovery from the 
depression and the departure from gold. According to this consensus, 
those countries that maintained their commitment to the gold standard 
incurred overvaluation of their currencies, were forced to keep interest 
rates high, and paid for this with sluggish and delayed recoveries. Figure 
                                         
10    See Schubert (1991). 
11    See James (1985), James (1986), Schnabel (2004).  
12  The literature on this is huge. For a discussion see Eichengreen (1992b).  
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7a shows inflation and GDP growth in the 1930s for countries on and off 
gold separately. While there is a weak positive correlation in both cases, 
the countries off gold exhibit higher overall GDP growth as expected. 
Figure 7.b examines the correlation between a currency’s overvaluation 
relative to the sterling and its GDP growth in the 1930s. Contrary to 
expectation, no correlation seems to emerge. Instead real exchange rates 
among the devaluating countries appear to cluster around two levels: 
parity to sterling and undervaluation around 70%, without any clear-cut 
growth advantage for either group. This is a puzzle: while countries that 
devalued had higher growth in the 1930s, neither induced inflation nor 
changes to external competitiveness, exploiting incomplete exchange rate 
pass-through, suggest themselves as a reason. Wolf (2008) has argued 
that the decision to devalue was largely driven by other considerations, 
and may have been endogenous to both inflation and currency 
undervaluation. The evidence in Figure 7 would be consistent with that. 
By the late 1930s, the process of abandoning the gold standard 
had come to a close. The main characteristic feature of the new currency 
system was the prevalence of bilateral exchange agreements that often 
subjected long lists of goods to quotas and an elaborate system of split 
exchange rates. While not the first country to move to such agreements, 
Germany became the centre of this system after 1933, and tried to exploit 
it for its economic war preparation.13  
Monetary factors, being the most prominent interpretation of the 
interwar depression today, thus contribute to its explanation in varying 
measure. Deflationary monetary policy is still popular as an explanation of 
the recession of 1920/21 in the UK and the US. Yet, as we have seen, 
deflation without depression was widespread in Europe after World War I, 
casting some doubt on this explanation. In contrast, the role of fixed 
                                         
13 See Ellis (1941). A review of the literature is  Ritschl (2001). 
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exchange rates in spreading the depression after 1929 is undisputed. 
Countries that broke off the gold standard in the 1930s fared better than 
those which did not. Yet the mechanisms behind this appear to be less 
obvious than it seems.  
 
 
4.       Social conflict and the European inter-war business cycle 
Before 1914, most economies of Europe resembled the model of 
the 19th century market economy, with little or no welfare policy and no 
institutional role for trade unions. Also, most European societies still had 
large employment shares in agriculture, so that the task of providing 
insurance against old age or sickness was largely still borne by the family.  
After World War I, many countries saw their social institutions and 
labour markets being reshaped very swiftly, and with far-reaching 
consequences. In the more advanced economies, the eight hour day 
became the norm in industry almost universally. Unionisation and the 
right to strike were now institutionalised or at last became common 
practice.14 This had the effect of altering the wage finding mechanism 
away from bilateral towards collective bargaining. In the wake of this 
institutional change, wage shares in national incomes went up markedly 
compared to the pre-war period.15  
At the same time, the beginning of active welfare policy and the 
gradual introduction of unemployment insurance increased the 
replacement ratio, i.e. the level of welfare benefits relatives to the going 
wage. Some countries in Europe instead experimented with generous 
minimum wages, arguably with similarly adverse results. 
All these factors – the increased bargaining power of unions, the 
rise in replacement ratios, the introduction of minimum wages – have 
                                         
14  See the comparative evidence on trade unions collected by Bain and Price (1980).  
15  See Broadberry and Ritschl (1995) for evidence on Britain and Germany. 
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been held responsible for persistent unemployment and a slow pace of 
recovery in the early 1920s.16 Similar views have also been held for the 
persistence of the depression into the 1930s.17 A case in point is the pro-
labour policy of the Blum government in France beginning in 1934.18 
There is also the claim, now well accepted, that welfare policies and 
labour-friendly wage mediation by the state contributed to the economic 
demise of Germany’s Weimar Republic.19  
The expansion of the welfare state and the adoption of labour-
friendly wage finding mechanisms in the early 1920s went hand in hand 
with major political convulsions in much of Europe. Everywhere, labour 
movements gained political influence and used it to promote the rights of 
organised labour, as well as universal suffrage and women’s rights. In 
spite of attempts to find a compromise with organised labour during World 
War I, monarchies everywhere on the continent were toppled in 
revolutionary processes, with the exception of the Netherlands and 
Scandinavia, which had been neutral in the war and where transition to 
democracy was managed peacefully. Under threat from the extreme left, 
which had taken power in Russia (and briefly in Hungary and parts of 
Germany), right wing movements formed in many parts of Europe. These 
movements would share the revolutionary impetus of the left and appeal 
to similar strata of the population. Yet they typically combined populist 
welfare policies with aggressive economic nationalism. Over time, the 
weak democracies that formed in continental Europe after World War I 
                                         
16  The seminal contribution on the effects of unemployment insurance in Britain is 
Benjamin and Kochin (1979). Broadberry (1986) emphasised the effects of unionisation 
and the eight hour day on labour supply and wage rates.  
17  In the context of a stochastic growth model with labour market frictions, Cole and 
Ohanian (2002) again stress the rise in the replacement ratio, combined with workers’ 
decreased sectoral and regional mobility, as a main factor steering the UK away from 
its long-run trend in the 1920s and 1930s. 
18  See Beaudry and Portier (2002), who employ a framework related to that of Cole 
and Ohanian.  
19  Borchardt (1991 [1982]). Fisher and Hornstein (2002) obtain similar conclusions in a 
stochastic growth framework.  
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increasingly came to feel the pressure from revolutionaries on both the 
left and the right. Before World War II, most of these countries had 
succumbed to authoritarian rule from the right. These regimes used the 
revolutionary impetus from the early 1920s, copying the model of Italian 
fascism, but rescinded the rights of organised labour. Trade unions were 
dissolved and labour was put under state-controlled umbrella 
organisations. Labour force participation of women was again 
discouraged, and agriculture received special promotion at the expense 
of further industrialisation. Still, industrial wage shares did not come down 
to the levels of 1913 again; all dictatorships of continental Europe built 
their legitimacy on pro-labour pretensions, and mostly refrained from 
cracking down on the material gains that labour had received in the 1920s 
as strongly as on their political organisations.  
Soviet labour policies took a radical departure from the Western 
European model in the 1920s. But not unlike the right-wing dictatorships 
that later emerged in Europe, it suffocated independent labour 
movements and their political representations, and instituted state-
controlled umbrella organisations in their place. The effects of these 
policies on the material well being of the industrial working class seem 
doubtful. Collectivisation of agriculture according to the same principles 
entailed human cost that arguably amounted to several million lives, see 
Davies and Wheatcroft (2004).  
While the labour market paradigm is useful in explaining post-war 
turmoil as well as the weak recoveries of the 1920s and the 1930s, it 
appears somewhat less successful in explaining the universal recession 
of 1929-32. High wage policies that may have adversely affected 
unemployment were in force quite evenly across Europe, yet the depth 
and the persistence off the 1929-32 recession varied quite a lot. In 
addition, recovery back towards historical trends was strongest in 
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Scandinavia, where stringent pro-labour market regulation was in effect in 
the 1930s, and in Germany, where quite the opposite was true.  
 
 
5.        International Trade 
In most European countries, the pre-1914 period was generally a 
time of moderate tariffs, which were often levied more for fiscal reasons 
than in order to protect home markets. Economic warfare during 1914-18 
reduced trade to minimal levels, notably through the Allied blockade and 
– to a lesser extent – through German submarine warfare and other 
counter-blockade measures. As a consequence, international trade was 
severely depressed in Central Europe at the end of the war, but far less 
so in Western Europe with its access to the Atlantic Ocean. This wartime 
difference in trade appears to explain to a large extent the different timing 
of the wartime recession in Continental and Western Europe, discussed 
above in Section 2.20  
Restoration of commercial trade after World War I was generally 
sluggish, owing to some extent to the German reparations conflict and the 
developing hyperinflations in Central Europe. Tariff conflicts between 
Germany on the one hand and Poland and France on the other further 
delayed the recovery of trade in the mid-1920s. In East Central Europe, 
trade was further inhibited by the erection of tariff barriers between the 
former parts of the Habsburg monarchy. In addition, post-revolutionary 
turmoil in Russia and the establishment of a state monopoly in foreign 
trade seriously damaged Central Europe’s trade with Russia. 
As a consequence, trade had not fully recovered to its 1913 levels 
by 1929. The general decline in overall trade volumes was accompanied 
                                         
20  Ritschl (2005) documents a tight relationship between declining imports and 
decreasing output in Germany for World War I. Disruption of imports to the British war 
economy, although at times substantial, was far less in magnitude, see Broadberry and 
Howlett (2005).  
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by changes in the country and commodity structure of trade. Deprived of 
many of her overseas assets, Britain struggled to maintain balance of 
payments equilibrium in the 1920s, and lost major export markets for its 
declining classical industries of the 19th century. Germany developed 
massive import surpluses during the hyperinflation, a tendency that 
continued through the 1920s almost without interruption.  
The beginning of the international depression quickly depressed 
trade volumes once again. Short of foreign credit inflows that had 
supported its trade deficits in the 1920s, Germany adopted a policy of 
drastic deflation, and generated high trade surpluses since 1930, thus 
transmitting a strong recessionary impulse throughout Europe.21 Worries 
about foreign exchange reserves spread in 1931 and led to the 
widespread adoption of bilateral trade and exchange agreements, thus 
effectively linking trade flows to capital controls. The protectionist 
Smoot/Hawley tariff of 1930 in the U.S., as well as the Commonwealth’s 
Ottawa preferences of 1932, added to the protectionist impetus. 
Germany’s transition to tight capital controls and trade quotas in 1933 
cemented the new trade regime. As a consequence, international trade in 
the 1930s failed to fully recover from the recession, and the degree of 
openness of Europe’s economies fell to lower levels than ever since the 
mid-19th century (Table 1). At the same time, the imbalances on capital 
accounts that had characterised the 1920s almost disappeared. 
Achieving equilibrium on the balance of payments and the balance of 
trade simultaneously became a paramount economic policy goal in the 
1930s, and was implemented through policy fiat rather than through 
market forces.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
                                         
21 See Ritschl (2002b), Ritschl (2003).  
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The trade policies of the 1930s were not just motivated by financial 
concerns. Import substitution policies targeted sectors thought to be 
strategically important. Agricultural protectionism aimed to improve self-
sufficiency in order to confront future wartime blockades. As a 
consequence, substantial resources were invested in building up 
industries in sectors ranging from steel to chemicals and textiles, thus 
diverting and substituting trade for the sake of war preparation. This also 
implied major redistribution of incomes to domestic agriculture and to the 
import substitution industries. This in turn had the effects of slowing down 
the relative decline of agricultural employment, and of channelling 
substantial parts of the pool of unemployed into the new, war related 
import substitution industries. In this way, Europe in the 1930s fell back 
into a state of mercantilism, forgoing the gains from trade for the sake of 
increased national self-sufficiency, a policy goal that was incompatible 
with market processes.  
 
 
6.       Capital flows, international conflict and the European inter-war 
business cycle  
Between the 1860s and 1914, international politics had remarkably 
little influence on economic fluctuations in Europe. Europe’s advanced 
countries did attempt to use capital exports and direct investment in the 
periphery of Europe to their strategic advantage.22 Yet, most of the 
economic rivalry between Europe’s Great Powers found its outlet in 
colonial adventures. Closer to home, the prevailing doctrine was to refrain 
from using state interventionism in markets as a leverage to gain the 
upper hand in international rivalries. An exemplary case was the 
“commercialisation” of France’s reparations to Germany after the war of 
                                         
22 See Fishlow (1985), Davis and Huttenback (1986). For more recent debates, see 
Flandreau, Le Cacheux and Zumer (1998), Ferguson and Schularick (2006).  
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1870/1.23 France issued bonds on international markets, paid off the 
Germans, and thus transformed its political debt into a purely commercial 
one. Germany used parts of the proceeds to back its new currency, the 
mark, which it linked to Britain’s gold standard rather than to the French-
dominated bimetallic system. Still, discriminatory practices in monetary 
policy were mostly absent. An atmosphere prevailed in which money and 
financial markets were seen as a matter for experts, to be sheltered from 
political interference. Under the classical gold standard that originated in 
the 1870s, central bank cooperation continued even in times of 
heightened political tension between their governments, notably in the 
crises of 1907 and 1911.24  
All this changed dramatically with World War I. Schemes for 
punitive reparations were drawn up on both sides during the war. 
Germany’s ruthless financial exploitation of occupied Belgium served as a 
model for future financial warfare. Large scale territorial changes were 
envisaged, and policy proposals discussed in German government circles 
even suggested the ethnical cleansing of large swaths of Eastern 
Europe25. Given such scenarios, the armistice of 1918 and the economic 
conditions attached to it look less radical than it might first seem.  
Historians have long argued that the feud over German reparations 
and its twin, the inter-allied credits owed to the U.S. by France and 
Britain, overshadowed financial relations between 1919 and 1932. The 
interference of political matters at times seriously impaired the normal 
functioning of international capital markets, and undermined domestic 
stability in some of the core countries. The reparations bill of 1921 is held 
to have contributed to tax revolt, civil unrest, and the transition to 
hyperinflation in Germany, see Feldman (1993). German refusal to pay 
                                         
23 See White (2001).  
24  Representative of a large literature is Eichengreen (1992a). 
25  The seminal work on Germany’s long term war aims is Fischer (1967). 
 22
reparations at the stipulated rates played a part in destabilising the 
French budget in the early 1920s, with consequences for the Franc that 
lasted throughout the decade.26 American-brokered stabilisation of 
Germany under the Dawes Plan of 1924 set capital flows between 
Germany and international markets in motion again.27 Yet, it provided no 
final settlement and left the future of the controversial inter-allied debts 
open. French refusal to serve these debts to the US unless these were 
fully securitised by future German reparations led to a US credit ban on 
France. This had the effect of cutting the French off the American market 
and motivated France’s much-criticised policy of hoarding gold, which in 
turn contributed to destabilising the inter-war gold standard.28  
Capital flows between the US and Europe during the second half of 
the 1920s were nevertheless substantial. Many of these credit flows were 
directed to Germany, which on balance absorbed the entire net capital 
exports form the U.S. during the second half of the 1920s.29 For a half a 
decade, Germany turned into the world’s largest net capital importer, 
enabling the Germans to pay all reparations under the Dawes Plan on 
credit.30  
Historians have argued that the Germans abused the Dawes Plan 
to over-borrow in international markets;31 sovereign debt theory would 
predict they had every incentive to do so.32 As a result, Germany’s foreign 
                                         
26  Schuker (1976b),  Prati (1991), Hautcoeur and Sicsic (1999).  
27  Among other things, the Dawes Plan internationalised Germany’s central bank, 
protected its new currency from reparation transfers, provided a major international 
loan, and designed a new reparation schedule that was quite favourable to the 
Germans. However, it provided no final settlement. 
28  See Schuker (1976a) on the political fallout of the Dawes Plan. A contemporary 
treatment of the interconnection between the two types of debt is Boyden (1928). On 
the political constraints of French currency policy at the time see Mouré (1991).  
29  See Ritschl (2002b). 
30  See Kindleberger (1973) for a discussion of this debt recycling mechanism. 
31  See Link (1970), Schuker (1988). 
32  Ritschl (2002a). 
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debt, including the present value of reparations, stood somewhere near 
80 percent of GNP in 1929 when the international recession broke out. 
Monetary and financial crisis management under the informal rules 
of central bank cooperation established in the 19th century would have 
dictated swift and discreet support for the German currency once 
difficulties arose. Such cooperation as existed during the inter-war period 
clearly failed to provide these services.33 The attempted ersatz 
commercialisation of German reparations in the Dawes Plan had 
seemingly succeeded in decoupling international politics and financial 
relations for a while. With the much stricter Young Plan of 1929/30, the 
former link between the two was firmly re-established. Being essentially a 
payback scheme for inter-allied war credits, the Young Plan aligned 
French and British interests in shedding off their war debt with America’s 
interest in avoiding default on these credits. At the same time, it implicitly 
– and, one could argue, belatedly – placed Germany under Allied 
financial control, and thus inextricably intertwined any future monetary 
rescue operations under the Gold Standard with the German debt and 
reparation problem.34  
To de-politicise central bank cooperation under these 
circumstances, the Bank of International Settlements was created. 
However, classical-style, discreet central bank cooperation proved 
impossible when after two years of forced deflation and austerity, the 
German payments crisis broke out in 1931.35 Plans for financial 
assistance were quickly loaded with political issues, and soon it turned 
                                         
33  This is a central theme in Eichengreen’s (1992) account of the inter-war depression. 
On the wider theme of inter-war central bank cooperation, see Clarke (1976). A rather 
more critical perspective is Mouré (2002).  
34  Ritschl (2002a). 
35  On this and the following, see the detailed account of the German crisis given in 
James (1985), James (1986). Toniolo (2005) documents the attempts to implement 
cooperation at the nascent Bank of International Settlements in spite of political 
intervention from all sides. 
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out that no debt relief was possible without addressing the deeper issues 
underlying the Young Plan. A temporary way out of the deadlock was only 
achieved after the US proposed a one-year moratorium on all political 
debt, thus finally accepting the link between reparations and inter-allied 
debt. The price for this political arrangement in lieu of central bank 
cooperation was the imposition of capital controls in July of 1931, and 
thus Germany’s exit from the Gold Standard.  
German debt problems and international conflict continued to 
plague financial markets through the mid-1930s. Negotiations over 
reparations were delayed to mid-1932, provoking further deflationary 
measures in both France and Germany. In the wake of the end to 
German reparations (in August 1932), France and Britain declared default 
on their inter-allied war debt owed to the US (in December 1932). 
Germany defaulted on increasing portions of her commercial debt and 
obtained rescheduling deals on others. By 1935, the average default rate 
was between 80 and 90 percent.36 As a consequence, international 
financial relations in Europe were channelled into a network of 
increasingly tight capital and exchange control agreements.37 Before 
World War II, trade and payments in large parts of Europe had become a 
matter of politics and bureaucratic interference, creating a new, extreme 
version of mercantilism whose principal aim was to utilise trade as a 
weapon in international conflict.  
 
 
7.        Conclusions 
The inter-war period witnessed a long-term downward deviation 
from Europe’s output and income growth trends, a truly Great Depression 
that lasted from 1914 to 1945 and that has no comparison in the 19th 
                                         
36  Klug (1993). 
37  See Einzig (1934), Child (1958). 
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century. In it were embedded three severe recessions, each of which 
would probably qualify for being the deepest European recession since 
the Industrial Revolution, had it not been for the respective subsequent, 
even deeper one. This chapter surveyed some of the most prominent 
interpretations of these recessions. It has argued that this highly 
pathological period of European economic history cannot be analysed 
separately from two dimensions of conflict that ravaged Europe at the 
time. One is international conflict, represented by Germany’s two wars 
against its neighbouring countries. The other is social conflict, connected 
mainly to the increasing role of labour movements and the concomitant 
changes in the distribution of income, but also to the first spread of civil 
rights and the changing role of women. Both dimensions of conflict 
strongly impacted on business cycle outcomes in the inter-war period.  
Social conflict is one key variable that may have steered the 
economies of Europe away from their previous long-term growth path: 
unionisation, the eight hour day, and the expansion of welfare benefits all 
changed the balance of bargaining power in labour markets, increased 
wage shares and lowered profit margins. Social conflict also was a key 
factor in the rise of authoritarian regimes all across continental Europe, 
which tried to reverse the results of the 1920s by forcing economic growth 
at the expense of living standards – usually achieving the latter but not 
necessarily the former policy goal.  
International conflict was paramount in the war-related recessions 
of 1914-1918 and again 1940-45. But it also played a decisive part in the 
failed attempts to stabilise the European economies during the proper 
inter-war years. This chapter has argued that continuing conflict over 
Germany’s reparations seriously impaired the functioning of international 
financial markets in the interwar period, and also prevented central bank 
cooperation from defusing the crisis of the Gold Standard in 1931. The 
German debt default that began to unfold in the spring of 1931 turned a 
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serious but potentially manageable crisis of the European interwar 
monetary system into a catastrophe with long term consequences. Under 
the pathological political conditions prevailing in Europe during the inter-
war period, it is hard to see how a more robust international financial 
architecture could have been designed that would have produced 
significantly better outcomes. 
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Figure 1:  Europe's Great Depression and Recovery, 1913-1973: Western 
European GDP per Capita Relative to 1.95 % Growth Trend 
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Source: Calculated from data in Maddison (2003)
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Figure 2: GDP per Capita Relative to 2 % Growth Trend (1913=100)
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Figure 3:  Postwar inflation, stabilisation, and inflation recurrence in 
Europe  
 
a) Stabilising at pre-war parity after hyperinflation in the 1920s 
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b) Stabilising at pre-war parity after deflation in the 1920s 
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c) Stabilising at new parity in the 1920s  
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Source: Calculated from data in League of Nations (1931), League of Nations (1940), 
Mitchell (2003), Lains (2003) 
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Figure 4: Real Exchange Rates (UK = 100) 
 
a) Stabilising at pre-war parity after hyperinflation in the 1920s 
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b) Stabilising at pre-war parity after deflation in the 1920s 
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c) Stabilising at new parity in the 1920s  
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Source: Calculated from data in League of Nations (1931), League of Nations (1940), 
Mitchell (2003), Lains (2003) 
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Figure 5: Unemployment 
 
a) Stabilising at pre-war parity after hyperinflation in the 1920s 
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b) Stabilising at pre-war parity after deflation in the 1920s 
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c) Stabilising at new parity in the 1920s  
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Figure 6: The Inflation/Unemployment Trade-Off 
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Figure 7: Devaluation and Economic Recovery in the 1930s 
 
a) Inflation and Growth 
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b) Real Exchange Rates and Growth 
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Table 1: Regional Distribution of World Trade, 
1913-1937 (Exports, mill. 1990 U.S. dollars) 
  
     
   1913 1928 1937 
       
   (in %)  (in %)  (in %)  
Europe  
(including Russia) 
58.9 139198 48.0 160516 47.0 152284
North America  
(Canada and US) 
14.8 34977 19.8 66213 17.1 55406
Latin America  8.3 19615 9.8 32772 10.2 33049
Asia   11.8 27887 15.5 51833 16.9 54758
Africa   3.7 8744 4.0 13376 5.3 17172
Oceania   2.5 5908 2.9 9698 3.5 11340
     
Total   100.0 236330 100.0 334408 100.0 324009
     
Source: Our calculations using data from Kenwood and Lougheed (1992) and 
Maddison (1995). 
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